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The Body Drawn Between Knowledge and Desire
J. Kent Fitzsimons
‘Refer to the drawing!’ This is in essence how the 
architect in Adolf Loos’s parable ‘The Story of the 
Poor Rich Man’ reacts when his wealthy client 
forgets the proper location for one of the carefully 
designed objects in his house.1 Loos’s fictional 
Art Nouveau architect has designed everything at 
every scale, coordinating vases with staircases and 
slippers with wood floors. The drawing is such a 
powerful record that even he relies on it to ensure 
his intentions for the client’s aesthetic delight. Here, 
drawing architecture is a kind of labour of love that 
delineates how the architect would touch others 
through their senses. At the same time, the drawing 
mobilizes general knowledge about perception and 
spatial occupation. Its relationship to the world that 
it describes depends on the body’s normal capaci-
ties to see and feel, to move or stay still. Drawing 
architecture thus associates two forces: the desire 
to touch another body through precise material 
configurations, and the power to sustain and trans-
mit knowledge about the human body in general. 
The body is thus drawn between desire’s touch 
and knowledge’s grasp. This article will discuss 
how knowledge and desire are ineluctably joined in 
architectural drawing, as well as the ethical consid-
erations raised by this coupling.2
Commentators on ‘The Story of the Poor Rich 
Man’ tend to adopt Loos’s perspective that there 
is something inherently wrong with the designer’s 
attempt to conceive every aspect of an environment 
or experience. Indeed, Loos’s moral tale lends itself 
more readily to sympathizing with the client, who is 
left with no room for play (Spielraum) in his life. Loos 
argues that a wealthy client with every reason to be 
content may be driven to despair by the overbearing 
presence of design intentions in his house. There 
is clearly no place for the unpredictability of gifts or 
whims. Realizing that he is ‘complete’ by virtue of 
the architect’s total work of art, the poor rich man 
concludes: ‘Now I must live with my own corpse.’
Loos sketches a rather unflattering picture of 
the architect as a snide authoritarian: ‘Those two 
spots of colour destroy the atmosphere. Don’t you 
understand that?’ ‘Did I not consider everything? 
You need nothing else.’ It is nevertheless possible 
to give the architect the benefit of the doubt and to 
postulate that perhaps his efforts, while clumsy on 
the level of interpersonal relations, stem at least in 
part from a sincere intention to improve his client’s 
life rather than impoverish it. Through a scorn that 
those familiar with the profession may recognize as 
frustration, perhaps this architect is also expressing 
the desire to affect a man who seemed so eager to 
enjoy a beautiful house. He works not only for mate-
rial gain or public recognition (although he clearly 
considers these); his design is also a labour of love. 
It is perhaps not passionate love, but the architect’s 
concern for the well-being of another person, or for 
others in general, partakes of an economy of desire 
with complex mechanisms and manifestations.
This architect is of course a fictional character 
(although it is tempting to imagine that Loos based 
his architect-client exchanges on anecdotes over-
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Does the need for survival or for public recognition 
fully explain the effort to draw environments that, if 
built, will affect others through physical sensation? 
A multifaceted desire may also be involved when 
we draw relationships between design and life. 
The second consideration is the nature of design’s 
effect on human experience. Do the notions that 
design thinking deploys about what people think 
and feel in architecture become reality, and, if so, 
how does this happen? Given that architects tend to 
express only good intentions, this may not seem to 
be a concern. However, in so far as drawing carries 
knowledge about the body such as its average size 
and abilities, it participates in the power relations 
through which different bodily capacities and expe-
riences are given relative value. We will see that 
negative effects can insinuate themselves into the 
passage from design to life independently of ideol-
ogy or doctrine, and that drawing therefore involves 
a degree of risk.
From this perspective, the ethical question is not, 
as Loos’s tale suggests, to what degree of detail 
architects should design environments destined 
for others. It is rather how drawing might harness 
the architect’s desire to affect others without inad-
vertently impoverishing our idea of the body and 
its relation to architecture. This essay attempts to 
elaborate a theoretical framework within which that 
question may be explored.
Knowledge and Desire
Architectural drawing’s ability to evoke the body 
associates knowledge and desire in a complex web 
whose threads are difficult to untangle. Because 
a drawing has a degree of autonomy with respect 
to the intentions at its origin, it is possible that an 
architectural project drawn from a longing for a 
specific person also contributes to circulating and 
reinforcing suppositions about the human body in 
general. Conversely, an apparently staid architec-
tural drawing that evokes nobody in particular may 
also be marked with very human desire.
heard in Vienna Secession circles), yet Loos’s 
cautionary tale was part of a very real debate around 
1900 regarding the way that design should enter 
people’s lives.3 That debate has echoes reaching 
as far as contemporary manifestations of avant-
garde design practices.4 It opposes a nostalgic or 
reactionary attempt to adorn daily life with authentic 
art and a modernist ethos that promotes sobriety 
and reproducibility in the interest of the greatest 
comfort and freedom for all. In Loos’s argument, 
the distinction between art and use is important: the 
first should not invade the sphere of the second. 
However, there are some problems with constru-
ing the opposition this way. On the one hand, 
casting the excessively involved architect against 
the overwhelmed occupant too easily resorts to a 
simplistic schema with an offender and a victim, 
a ‘strategist’ and a ‘tactician’ (to borrow Michel de 
Certeau’s formulation, which I will discuss below), 
or, conversely, a misunderstood artist and an uncul-
tured commoner. Here, architectural drawing would 
be reserved for an elite that imposes its values 
through design. On the other hand, the restrained 
position, whereby design intervenes in a minimal 
but still fundamental way, risks defining architecture 
as a technical intervention dominated by standards, 
norms, and generalizations about how people live. 
Drawing would therefore be a mere disincarnate 
tool. Overall, this debate tends to position aesthet-
ics and function as polar opposites, a schema that 
fails when applied to real circumstances.
If we focus on the status of drawing in the rela-
tionship between design and life, the debate takes 
an interesting turn. Drawing architecture harbours 
a concern for the human body. Regardless of its 
degree of detail, the architectural drawing has 
a hold on the world because its contents relate 
to bodily experience. Design and life are linked 
through the conventions that allow us, for example, 
to make sense of plans and sections. This relation-
ship raises two considerations. The first involves 
the force that drives architects to design for others. 
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phantasmatic, spectral trace of the desire to hold 
on to the loved one, to keep some trace of his life 
during his absence.’6 Drawing would be, according 
to Mitchell, mixed up with emotions including love 
and control (‘to hold on’). It would also harbour a fear 
that may give way to denial: ‘The silhouette drawing 
... expresses the wish to deny death or departure, 
to hold on to the loved one, to keep him present and 
permanently “alive”.’7 The story attributes drawing 
to the imposed distance between human beings 
that are otherwise drawn together. Leonard Cohen 
expresses the corollary of this idea in lyrics: ‘True 
love leaves no traces / If you and I are one / They’re 
lost in our embraces / Like stars against the sun.’8 
In the absence of an embrace, Loos thus plans a 
house for Josephine Baker. But is this also true for 
the rich man’s snide architect? Probably to a lesser 
personal degree and more clearly with regards to 
psychological factors that link one human being to 
human beings in general, but before developing 
that idea, a few more aspects of drawing need be 
elaborated.
Robin Evans also discusses the significance of 
Pliny’s myth, although he offers a twist by evoking 
architect and painter Karl Freidrich Schinkel’s 
version of ‘The Origin of Painting’ (1830) [fig. 2].9 As 
Evans points out, Schinkel sets the scene outdoors 
and depicts the subject’s shadow projected onto 
a rocky outcrop rather than on a wall of dressed 
stone. This differs from the interior architectural 
space portrayed in other versions, themselves 
faithful to Pliny’s textual description. For Evans, 
Schinkel’s departure from the conventional story 
suggests in an oblique way that architecture origi-
nates in drawing and therefore cannot be the setting 
of its invention: ‘Without drawing there could be 
no architecture, at least no classical architecture 
constructed on the lines of geometrical definition.’10 
Evans also observes that the light source that 
produces the shadow is not a lamp, but the sun. 
The former constitutes a point that is analogous to 
the principles of naturalistic perspective represen-
Loos himself offers a case to consider, this 
time as architect rather than cultural critic. When 
he designed a never-built (and probably never-
commissioned) house for Josephine Baker (1928), 
his drawings mobilized and transmitted knowledge 
of the human body in general [fig. 1]. The slope of 
a stairway, the width of passage, and the height of 
a window all refer to accepted corporal dimensions 
and abilities. These are encoded in the drawings, 
available for retrieval by anyone with a means to 
measure. Despite all the difference Loos would 
place between himself and his fictional architect, 
they both mobilize knowledge about how people 
perceive their surroundings, about the extent of their 
reach, about the way they occupy a chair. And this 
knowledge precedes, is refined or generated, and is 
retrieved in their drawings, with the difference that, 
in the fictional case, it is simply more dressed up.
At the same time, Loos deployed architecture 
to express his desire for the dancer’s body. The 
sections and plans suggest that the Viennese archi-
tect imagined Baker swimming in a pool whose 
submerged walls include large windows looking 
into the watery stage, enveloping the dancer’s body 
while putting it on display for guests - a group in 
which Loos probably hoped to count. In this design, 
Loos both reproduces disciplinary knowledge about 
what a body is and should be able to do, and, as 
Farès el-Dahdah argues, ‘instrumentalizes a build-
ing as a tactile extension of his senses in order to 
covet the exoticized body of an absent Josephine 
Baker’.5
Interestingly, Pliny the Elder’s (23 - 79 CE) widely 
cited story situates the origin of drawing in love. Pliny 
describes how Diboutades traced the shadow of her 
departing lover by lamplight. This story has been a 
popular subject of painting in Western art, elicit-
ing the interest of William Mitchell, among others. 
For Mitchell, the erotic circumstances of drawing’s 
ostensible invention are clear: ‘So the image is born 
of desire, is (we might say) a symptom of desire, a 
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example of projection is tenuously related to archi-
tecture, as it deals with figural representation rather 
than buildings. For example, in his own discussion 
of the story of Diboutades, Stan Allen distinguishes 
architecture’s situation from that of painting: ‘In 
architecture there is no preexisting object to imitate: 
no body to cast a shadow.’14 It may be true that the 
lines traced in architectural drawings usually corre-
spond to the inert matter that constitutes buildings 
rather than to the body’s fleshy envelope. However, 
insofar as an architectural drawing derives sense by 
evoking the body’s scale and perceptual capacities, 
one cannot conclude that it does not reproduce the 
body in its own way. It is an imitation of the body not 
as form, but rather as an ensemble of sensing and 
motile capacities.15 (For that matter, figure painting 
is not only a matter of imitating people’s shapes.) 
In other words, the drawing appears architectural 
precisely because it makes reference to a corporal 
dimension. As soon as a drawing is recognized as 
the configuration of the built environment, it swells 
with evocations of the body’s characteristics. Even 
the driest plan contains the matter necessary for its 
author or reader to imagine what might be felt - in 
and through all the senses - by a body occupying 
‘the reality that will end up outside the drawing’. The 
very notion that there is reality beyond the drawing 
only makes sense if that real world is understood to 
possess qualities that lend themselves to percep-
tion. While Allen’s observation that ‘architecture 
tends to imitate pre-existing architectures’ may be 
accurate, it does not necessarily exclude the body’s 
role in architectural drawing. The body is a strong 
source of imitation in architecture. The imitation is 
simply not usually figural, and occurs more like a 
generous negative cast of movement and sensa-
tion.
This is where the matter of body knowledge 
arises. The hand that draws a plan is coexten-
sive with a body that, from birth, has felt the cold 
radiate from a massive wall, seen distant fields 
framed by a window, heard footsteps descending a 
tation, while the latter’s practically parallel lines 
correspond to the abstraction of the orthographic 
projections that characterize architectural represen-
tation.11 Schinkel’s version of the origin of drawing 
would therefore suggest that conceiving architec-
tural space requires drawing, and that such drawing 
objectifies the world that it represents. 
Together, these two aspects define rather well 
the notion of knowledge in drawing that I would 
like to develop parallel to that of desire. Architec-
tural drawing organizes knowledge so that it can 
act on the world. Evans notes that unlike drawing 
in the visual arts, drawing in architecture ‘is not so 
much produced by reflection on the reality outside 
the drawing, as productive of a reality that will end 
up outside the drawing’.12 It is oriented toward alter-
ing existing conditions, hence Schinkel’s apparent 
concern with a chronology in which tracing lines 
precedes raising edifices. Complementing that 
orientation, architectural drawing consists of a 
formalized system ‘capable of transmitting informa-
tion’, as Stan Allen puts it.13 In Schinkel’s painting, 
that capacity is represented (but not exhausted) by 
the sun’s parallel lines casting an undistorted image 
of the model. The Josephine Baker house may be 
taken as a concrete example of these characteris-
tics of architectural drawing: Loos’s orthographic 
projections define precise spatial dimensions and 
proportions that portray a transformed world in which 
Josephine Baker could swim amidst her guests. At 
the same time, these objective plans and sections 
carry Loos’s desire for Josephine Baker like a stow-
away, to be read between the lines. Knowledge and 
desire cohabitate in Loos’s project.
The Body of Knowledge
The link between applied knowledge and the body 
in architectural drawing is complex. It would be 
misleading to infer from Schinkel’s version of Pliny’s 
myth that, since tracing a person’s shadow precedes 
building, figure drawing is the origin of architecture. 
Indeed, one could argue that Pliny’s body-centred 
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Fig. 1: The Josephine Baker House, Paris, by Adolf Loos, 1928. Plans and sections.
Image courtesy Thames and Hudson. Source: Ludwig Munz and Gustav Kunstler, Adolf Loos: Pioneer of Modern Archi-
tecture (London: Thames and Hudson, 1966).
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commentary on Michel Foucault’s writings (notably 
Discipline and Punish). But it is also corresponds to 
a central concern in much of de Certeau’s research, 
found in his most-cited book in architectural 
discourse, The Practice of Everyday Life, as well as 
in his work on historiography, mystics, cartography, 
and sociology. That concern, which he calls of the 
‘erotics of knowledge’,18 will help to identify some 
meeting points between architectural drawing’s 
moments of desire and knowledge.
Elaborating that point requires explaining why we 
should be concerned with body knowledge in archi-
tectural drawings. Why, in other words, does Loos’s 
story of an architect who, through good intentions, 
impoverishes his client’s life not seem entirely far-
fetched? Why should we be wary of progressively 
refined knowledge of how one sees one’s surround-
ings and ascends stairs, of what forms, colours, and 
textures can be associated and to what ends, how 
an object is held, how a chair is occupied? Much 
good stems from this body knowledge, not the least 
of which is that we can walk through doors without 
twisting our shoulders. However, a more pessimistic 
assessment is also possible, in particular in light of 
Foucault’s genealogy of disciplinary and regulatory 
societies.19
Discussing architectural drawing is a good 
opportunity to shift focus from the spatial aspects 
of Foucault’s ideas to what he called a ‘power of 
writing’. While strong insights about architecture 
and power have come from the focus on Foucault’s 
spatial metaphors, their relevance tends to be 
constrained to historical conditions that no longer 
exist. As a result, they distract from how writing, 
understood broadly, still constitutes a relationship 
between the body, knowledge, and power with 
significant social consequences. 
For Foucault’s description of the body’s ensnare-
ment in power relations, the ability to document is 
fundamental: ‘A “power of writing” was constituted 
wooden staircase, or crossed countless thresholds. 
That kind of inductive body knowledge informs the 
drawing and can be stirred up by it. Simultaneously, 
knowledge about the body’s size, movement, and 
sensation deduced and formalized through more 
objective methods is also at play. The most obvious 
examples of this deductive knowledge are the 
dimensions found in Architectural Graphic Stand-
ards or Neufert’s Architect’s Data, but it also resides 
in rules of thumb and norms related for example to 
air temperature and humidity.16 Notwithstanding the 
many other sciences at play in architecture, much 
of the knowledge mobilized in architectural drawing 
pertains to the human body: how it perceives, how 
it moves, what it requires for comfort and even for 
survival. 
Evans’s observations about architectural drawing 
find resonance in a broader field. Michel de Certeau 
defines the combination of code and action as a 
general phenomenon of knowledge production in 
modernity: 
[F]or the last four centuries all scientific enter-
prise has included among its traits the production 
of autonomous linguistic artifacts (its own specific 
languages and discourses) with an ability to trans-
form the things and bodies from which they had 
been distinguished.17
We need not construe architecture as a purely 
scientific undertaking to recognize that architec-
tural drawing functions like one of these ‘linguistic 
artifacts’. Nor need we drift into a debate about the 
similarities and differences between architecture 
and language to admit that, more specifically, archi-
tectural drawing has linguistic properties insofar 
as its conventions allow us to share ideas. For 
the issues at hand, let us retain that de Certeau’s 
definition corroborates the idea that the body is a 
site where architectural drawing’s twin qualities of 
system and transformation intervene. This stems no 
doubt in part from de Certeau’s careful reading and 
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Fig. 2: The Origin of Painting, by Karl Friedrich Schinkel, 1830. Image courtesy of the Von de Heydt Museum in Wup-
pertal.
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Ancient Greek oikonomia, the nomos of the oikos or 
organization of the household. Thus it carries the 
trace of ‘a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, 
measures, institutions that aim to manage, govern, 
control, and orient in a way that purports to be 
useful for the behaviours, gestures, and thoughts 
of human beings’.22 The apparatus is that which 
models, contaminates, or controls individual lives in 
the spirit of utility. That spirit is what is at stake when 
the body is grasped by the apparatuses that extend 
the reach of disciplines and regulation. 
For Agamben, the most ancient of apparatuses 
is perhaps language itself, ‘one in which thousands 
and thousands of years ago a primate inadvert-
ently let himself be captured’. I prefer ‘to grasp’ over 
Agamben’s ‘to capture’. The concern is not that the 
law enforcement agents or renegade machines (as 
in the film The Matrix) will physically seize individual 
bodies and place them where they are needed. The 
body is grasped by power relations because it is 
conceptualized in certain ways and not in others. 
Thinking the body in terms of how it should move, 
what it should perceive, what it should be able to do 
is an efficient way of coordinating it as a means to 
an end. The panopticon is no longer the appropriate 
architectural figure for Foucault’s model of discipli-
nary and regulatory societies. Architecture’s ability 
to implement the social programmes once served 
by circular prisons and hospitals has been super-
seded by other techniques. However, architectural 
drawing, as a critical tool in the science that studies 
the body in its natural and artificial environments, 
maintains an ever-expanding reach over the body.
Bill Hillier’s investigations of space syntax and 
the social logic of space provide an interesting 
example.23 Hillier’s analytical process evaluates 
the nature of sight lines in plan drawings of spatial 
configurations in order to articulate conclusions 
about the space’s relative ‘integration’ and ‘intel-
ligibility’.24 The drawing supports the projection of 
imaginary bodies into the represented space and 
as an essential part of the mechanisms of disci-
pline.’20 Tabulating information about bodies is the 
prerequisite for prescribing the movements, impos-
ing the exercises, and creating the body-based 
mechanisms that multiply the forces that go into 
them.21 For Foucault, a variety of graphic and textual 
representations of the body - what it is and could 
be, what it does and could do - are critical compo-
nents of anatomo-politics, the power that invests 
the body as a machine. Writing is the medium by 
which a discipline’s knowledge of the human body 
circulates in the absence of bodies, in particular 
those bodies that were observed in the ‘drawing up 
of tables’ and those for which the written prescrip-
tions are intended. 
Architectural drawing is a form of body knowledge 
that operates as one such ‘power of writing’. The 
corporal dimension of ‘power/knowledge’ grows not 
only through a spatial choreography in which real 
bodies see and are seen (as in a panopticon), but 
also through media that record information about 
the body, including architectural drawing. In a 
disciplinary or regulating mechanism involving the 
built environment, drawing provides the continuity 
of knowledge when the body is a memory or an 
anticipated return. Here, it is not a matter of how 
the architectural object’s physical structure makes 
vision both coercive and informative. Where a ring 
of cells around a central tower is understood to have 
power effects when there are bodies in the cells (but 
not necessarily in the tower), the writing hypothesis 
suggests that architectural drawing sustains the 
penetration of knowledge/power into human experi-
ence, even when there are no bodies to observe.
The Body Conceived in Drawing
The critique underlying Foucault’s argument is that 
the body is taken up into the micro-techniques of 
power towards utilitarian ends. Giorgio Agamben 
highlights this aspect in his elaboration of Foucault’s 
notion of the ‘apparatus’. Agamben traces the 
French dispositif through its Latin usages back to the 
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Fig. 3: Space Syntax Diagrams, by Bill Hillier, 1996.
Image courtesy Bill Hillier. Source: Space is the Machine: A Configurational Theory of Architecture (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996), p. 126.
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of elements oriented toward acting on the world - 
that is, an apparatus confident of its usefulness, 
which here takes the form of architectural discourse 
- this drawing privileges vision to the detriment of 
other senses, associates things seen to specific 
ways of thinking, and grasps the body-as-seeing-
device towards anticipated results. It participates in 
reducing the conception of the body’s relationship 
to experience in terms of usefulness. The body is 
grasped by power because the drawing’s knowl-
edge of lived experience is part of an apparatus that 
can alter the world outside it. As a consequence, 
architectural drawing helps to define which body 
attributes are important, what their parameters are, 
and how they can be harnessed towards specific 
ends.
Hillier’s space-syntax method seems remote 
from more familiar design practices. However, the 
conviction about the relationship between architec-
ture, bodily capacities and drawing that underpins it 
is very common. In the El Croquis presentation of 
the ‘Bordeaux House’, designed by Rem Koolhaas 
and the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (Floirac, 
France, 1995-98), a very compelling drawing repro-
duces the bedroom floor plan three times in order 
to articulate how the porthole windows correspond 
to visual effects for different positions and states 
of motion [fig. 4]. The accompanying text distin-
guishes a variety of situations - moving, sitting, 
washing, lying down, standing adult, standing 
children, wheelchair position - and relates them to 
horizon views (‘dynamic holes’), remarkable views 
(‘revealing holes’), and ‘anti-claustrophobic’ views 
(‘relative views’).26 The sight lines in the drawing 
help to determine not only each window’s position 
and height, but also the nature of its cut through 
the wall: as perpendicular cylinder, oblique cylin-
der, or cone. I will not address the house’s status 
as a work designed for a disabled client, despite its 
undeniable relevance for a discussion of architec-
ture and the body. It must suffice to note that the 
drawing records in a very precise way the spatial 
returns information about what can or cannot be 
seen from any given point. [Fig. 3] Plotted onto a 
scatter chart, that information gives a visual repre-
sentation of the configuration’s properties. In this 
case, the analysis results in assertions about how 
intelligible a plan of urban blocks is for the fictional 
people that are projected into the drawing - people 
that any architect can imagine there.  
For Hillier, the link between a graphic-based 
analytical method and lived experience is clear:
[S]tudies have shown that the choices that people 
make in selecting urban spaces for informal activi-
ties, such as eating, drinking, talking and sitting, 
reflect proximity or adjacency to areas with strong 
visual fields that are well integrated into the system 
as a whole. Such spaces are ideally suited to what 
seems to be the favourite occupation of those using 
urban space informally: watching other people.25
Hillier’s argument expresses the belief that archi-
tectural drawing can be used in association with 
analytical methods to determine the spatial configu-
ration necessary to achieve specific ends, in this 
case a certain form of urban sociability. Here, the 
spirit of utility is double and mutually reinforcing: 
physical space is useful for individuals, who are 
themselves useful for a social project.
Applied during the design process (as Hillier and 
his team did for Norman Foster Associates’ King’s 
Cross redevelopment master plan in London), this 
drawing method may well help to create urban envi-
ronments with ‘an intelligible pattern to the space 
structure’, where the ‘integration core’ is strongly 
defined, in short, in which one easily finds one’s 
way. But it also produces and perpetuates a few 
ideas about lived experience: that spatial orienta-
tion is primarily a matter of vision; that seeing things 
in a certain way corresponds to a specific way of 
understanding them; that vision may be used to get 
people to behave certain ways. Pulled into a network 
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Fig. 4: The Bordeaux House, Floirac, France, by Rem Koolhaas and OMA, 1995-98. Plans of upper floor. Image cour-
tesy OMA. Source: El Croquis 79, 1996, p. 174.
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apply knowledge about lived experience in the built 
environment to proper ends, we might argue that 
getting lost is the original mode of perceiving space.
Drawing and Desire
The debate about design and life, which occupied 
European architects around 1900, seems to have 
been unaware of the contemporaneous debate 
regarding the psychology of experience in which 
Dewey participated. If the two debates had been 
brought together, one might have observed that the 
problem in Loos’s anecdote is not that the archi-
tect designed too much and left no room for others 
to ‘furnish’ the rich man’s life, but that the thinking 
involved in furnishing the rich man’s life - whether 
the architect’s thinking or that of the loved ones that 
offer him gifts - conveys ideas about use, comfort 
and beauty that limit interpretations of experience. 
The rich man is perhaps not unhappy because 
everything in his life has been designed once and 
for all, but rather because he cannot imagine that 
wearing the bedroom slippers in the living room 
is a relevant experience. It is not surprising, then, 
that Dewey’s formula foreshadows such alterna-
tive paths to spatial knowledge as the situationist 
psychogeography and dérive.
Architects would characterize their practice as 
anything but an impoverishment of daily life. Yet it 
seems that getting closer to the lived experience 
of others through drawing necessarily feeds the 
parallel process in which knowledge/power thrives 
off the drawing’s science to better grasp the body 
in all its diversity. The challenge is therefore to 
imagine a drawing practice that acknowledges and 
fosters the architect’s profound motivation to affect 
others without contributing to the impoverishment of 
experience. In other words, how can architectural 
drawing touch the body without grasping it?
Michel de Certeau’s notion of an erotics of 
knowledge provides material for reflecting on the 
coincidence of moments of knowledge and desire in 
correspondence between a variety of bodily states 
and specific visual stimulants. It associates specific 
forms and locations with positions and movements, 
emphasizing visual perception and literally framing 
how experience in the house should be conceived. 
It furthermore applies and generates a more refined 
knowledge of the body than in Hillier’s example, 
regrettably echoing Foucault’s argument that the 
power of normalization does not so much homog-
enize as introduce ‘all the shading of individual 
differences’ in order to render these differences 
useful.27
The danger is neither the desired effect of clarity 
and sociability (in Hillier’s case) or of visual pleas-
ure and orientation (in that of Koolhaas); it is rather 
the side effect of perpetuating a utilitarian way 
of imaging the body’s movement and sensation 
that is pernicious for everyday life. My reference 
to Foucault’s arguments does not stem from a 
fear of secret forces seizing unwitting bodies, but 
rather from a preoccupation with how architectural 
drawing is tied to ways of thinking about the body 
- what he called epistémè. In that light, it is interest-
ing to recall John Dewey’s century-old observation 
of the inadequacies of conceptualizing the relation-
ship between sensation and action as a mechanical 
cause and effect arrow. With reference to the ‘child-
candle’ example of perception and movement in 
psychology, Dewey challenged the ordinary inter-
pretation that ‘the sensation of light is a stimulus to 
the grasping as a response, the burn resulting is 
a stimulus to withdrawing the hand as a response 
and so on’. In a turn of phrase that seems like a 
precursor of deconstruction, Dewey counters that, 
in fact, to understand the child’s experience of the 
candle, one must realize that that ‘the burn is the 
original seeing’.28 When architectural drawing is 
understood as the application of body knowledge 
to produce specific results, it follows the cause and 
effect model of human perception and action, and 
neglects the nuance that Dewey attempted to bring 
to the matter. Regarding Hillier’s use of drawing to 
21
‘ecstasy of reading’ tied to an ‘erotics of knowledge’. 
He himself takes ‘voluptuous pleasure in it’, recog-
nizing that ‘the fiction of knowledge is related to this 
lust to be a viewpoint and nothing more’.34 The vili-
fied strategist is therefore also driven by a kind of 
desire. The planner’s human condition is pushed 
even to mortality: ‘The voyeur-god created by this 
fiction ... knows only cadavers.’35 Just as the archi-
tect in Loos’s moral tale now only has affairs with a 
client who lives with his own corpse.
Reflections on this coincidence of knowledge, 
desire and mortality appear in numerous places. 
For example, in Michel Houellebecq’s recent novel 
La Carte et le Territoire, the artist protagonist has a 
moment of revelation in which disincarnated ration-
alization and human frailty coincide. Looking at 
a Michelin map in a roadside store, Jed Martin is 
stunned by its beauty: 
He had never contemplated an object as magnifi-
cent, as rich with emotion and meaning as this 1/150 
000 scale Michelin map of the Creuse in Haute-
Vienne. The essence of modernity, of a scientific 
and technical apprehension of the world, was mixed 
with the essence of animal life. The drawing was 
complex and beautiful, of absolute clarity, using 
only a restrained colour code. But in each hamlet, 
in each village represented according to its size, 
one felt the palpitation, the call of dozens of lives, 
of dozens or hundreds of souls - some destined to 
damnation, some to immortality.36
Houellebecq captures here the paradox whereby 
the abstraction of a cartographic drawing can 
elicit emotion. He echoes de Certeau, for whom 
the inseparability of writing’s impassioned motiva-
tions and rationalizing tendencies dates from the 
first hints of modernity. On the one hand, as we 
mentioned earlier, de Certeau attributes to four 
centuries of scientific enterprise ‘the production of 
autonomous linguistic artifacts’ that ‘transform the 
things and bodies from which they had been distin-
writing practices. In the well-known chapter ‘Walking 
in the City’, which begins with us ‘Seeing Manhat-
tan from the 110th floor’, the World Trade Center is 
a metaphor for the tools and techniques - includ-
ing drawing - that would transform what they allow 
us to observe.29 I will refrain from dwelling on de 
Certeau’s ‘tacticians’ or ‘walkers in the city’ in order 
to explore how his rendition of ‘the strategist’ can 
help to understand better the architect’s predica-
ment.
For de Certeau, standing on the tower’s viewing 
platform transforms the city ‘into a text that lies 
before one’s eyes’. ‘It allows one to read it, to be 
a solar eye’ - like Schinkel’s sunbeams stream-
ing past the posing figure. ‘Looking down like a 
god’ from on high, one sees ‘the analogue of the 
facsimile produced, through a projection that is a 
way of keeping aloof, by the space planner urban-
ist, city planner or cartographer’.30 One sees the 
‘texturology’ of a ‘concept city’.31 As with Evans’s 
view of architectural drawing and Foucault’s power 
of writing, constructing such a text, for de Certeau, 
depends on being isolated from that which it would 
alter. Writing fashions ‘on its own, blank space ... a 
text that has power over the exteriority from which 
it has first been isolated’.32 That power serves the 
ambition ‘to reform’ the ‘reality of things’.33 The 
whole image of Manhattan is analogous to that of 
the planner not only through resemblance, but also 
because it places the viewer in the distant position 
from which its alteration can be projected.
This maligned aspect of the planning professions 
is joyfully attacked in references to de Certeau’s 
celebration of the spatial practices that elude 
discipline. The temptation to oppose the ‘theo-
retical’ picture of the city with the ‘reality’ of lived 
space is indeed strong. However, where Foucault’s 
description of the power of writing is disincarnate, 
de Certeau insinuates problems of the flesh into 
his model of applied knowledge. For de Certeau, 
seeing the city from this height gives way to an 
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complete us - be it the physical presence of another, 
the acquisition of knowledge, or the experience of 
art and architecture.’45 Unlike Vigarello, however, 
Pérez-Gómez holds out the promise of reconcili-
ation through poetic making. The lack ‘does not 
disappear with the fulfilment of practical needs or 
with the possession of goods’, but it may be recon-
ciled ‘only within the cultural realm of poïesis and 
its metaphorical imagination’.46 Like literature for 
de Certeau, architectural drawing would be a site 
where a human being can cope with his or her exis-
tential condition. Unlike literature, however, it also 
carries what Houellebecq appropriately calls the 
‘scientific and technical apprehension of the world’, 
concerning in particular the body and its functions. 
Loos’s project for Josephine Baker might again 
illustrate one such coincidence of knowledge and 
desire, where standard norms regarding human 
perception and motion are carried by (or carry) one 
person’s longing for another.
Before concluding with the prospect for a drawing 
practice that acknowledges desire without ignoring 
its dangers, we should note that drawing’s desir-
ing facet may be understood other than in terms 
of lack. Mitchell explains the contrast between ‘the 
Freudian picture of desire as lack and longing for 
an object’, and the Deleuzian idea of ‘a “desiring 
machine” characterized by a joy founded in (but not 
disciplined by) ascesis’.47 Where Freud’s model has 
desire seeking pleasure, the ‘anti-Freudian, Deleu-
zian picture of desire is interrupted by pleasure, 
not driven by it’.48 Mitchell finds an early example 
in William Blake’s notion of the dialectic of binding 
and unbinding, which is figured in ‘the drawn line 
that leaps across a boundary at the same time 
that it defines it, producing a “living form”’.49 Blake 
provides a specifically architectural example of this 
movement in his drawing of the creator-god Urizen 
[fig. 5]. The drawing shows the compass-wielding 
demiurge reaching beyond a circle in which he has 
inscribed himself, only to begin drawing another 
circle. As Mitchell observes: ‘One could hardly ask 
guished’.37 On the other hand, in The Mystic Fable 
de Certeau characterizes modernity as a slow but 
inexorable transformation of faith into eroticism. 
In the passage from the medieval period to the 
Renaissance, religious demythification is mirrored 
by the mythification of erotic love. The object of love 
is less and less God, while the body of the Other is 
increasingly evoked in expressions of longing. That 
‘adored body’ is ‘as elusive as the vanishing god’: 
‘It haunts writing, which sings its loss without being 
able to accept it.’38 It is also a motor: ‘Despite the 
change of scene, the One does not cease organ-
izing by its absence a “Western” productivity.’39 That 
drive to produce advances in the form of ‘proliferat-
ing conquests destined to fill an original lack’.40 In 
the place of religion, modern historiography contin-
ues the task of producing ‘the relationship that a 
society maintains with its dead’,41 while an explicitly 
erotic literature continues this ‘work of mourning’, 
exemplified in Don Juan’s adventures, which only 
‘repeat the absence of the unique, inaccessible 
“woman”’.42
Georges Vigarello has gone so far as to suggest 
that this ‘nostalgia’ drives the human sciences’ 
production of knowledge about the human body. 
That dynamic would have the body become ‘the site 
of potential completeness and totalization’ for the 
actors of science, sustaining ‘an illusion of “recov-
ered” plenitude, as though the lack could finally be 
neutralized’.43 For Vigarello, the operations at work 
in ostensibly objective pursuits are homologous to 
those at work in the mind that suffers its inaugu-
ral split, as though individual longing had amplified 
itself to the scale of scientific production.44
In Built Upon Love: Architectural Longing After 
Ethics and Aesthetics, Alberto Pérez-Gómez, who 
would perhaps not characterize architecture as a 
human science in Vigarello’s sense, also argues 
that the human being’s inherent lack is a drive: 
‘Throughout our lives we constantly look for “some-
thing”, something that is missing and that might 
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Fig. 5: The Ancient Days, by William Blake. Frontispiece to Europe: A Prophecy, 1794. Copyright British Library Board.
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pates. One folds into the other: ‘The cannibal (who 
speaks) and La Boétie (who listens) are metaphors 
for each other.’ And both are present in the text as 
an inaccessible other.52
If speech is not only verbal ‘sayings’, but also 
wanderings, uses of space, or tactics whereby 
individuals appropriate the planned environment, 
architectural drawing is analogous to Montaigne’s 
essay. ‘The place of the other’ is literally what archi-
tectural drawing articulates. Speech is nothing 
other than the life that drawing tries to grasp as 
knowledge, and reception is the touch anticipated 
at the drawing’s destination. Under the conditions 
of modernity, authentic presence as exemplified by 
the cannibal’s ‘speech acts’ is no longer possible. 
For de Certeau, ‘if one cannot be a cannibal, there 
is still the option of lost-body writing’,53 a practice 
he attributes to Montaigne. He situates his own 
work in that tradition. If we consider the dedication 
at the beginning of The Practice of Everyday Life, 
the book appears less as an argument in favour of 
users over designers than as a conflicted work of 
knowledge and desire:
To the ordinary man.
... In invoking here at the outset of my narratives 
the absent figure who provides both their begin-
ning and their necessity, I inquire into the desire 
whose impossible object he represents. What are 
we asking this oracle whose voice is almost indistin-
guishable from the rumble of history to license us, 
to authorize us to say, when we dedicate to him the 
writing that one formerly offered in praise of gods or 
the inspiring muses?54
Lost-body writing stems from an unquenchable 
desire and questions the authority through which it 
takes ‘the place of the other’. It may be a model 
for a lost-body drawing that is a reflexive practice 
conscious of the ‘ruins’ that inhabit its lines: the 
ruins of the life that it can never quite seize but that 
disturbs its order, and those of the author him- or 
for a more vivid depiction of what Blake calls the 
“bounding line”, the line that binds, confines, and 
determines a boundary, and the line that leaps 
over a boundary, like a gazelle “bounding” over a 
fence.’50 It shows the architect’s ‘infinite desire for 
orderly, rational boundedness reproducing itself’. 
The ‘”binding” and “unbinding” of desire are fused 
in a single image’: a picture of the architect drawing 
his own body between knowledge and desire.
Lost-Body Drawing
Whether we take desire as lack or desire as binding 
and unbinding, architectural drawing plays a role, 
either as the phantasm of an absent body or as one 
piece of the assemblage that sustains the pleasure 
of deferred satisfaction. Neither mode can separate 
itself from the rational dimension of knowledge that 
the drawing also carries. To formulate an ethic of 
writing that assumes this double status, de Certeau 
returns to Montaigne’s essay ‘Of Cannibals’ (first 
published in 1580).51 He finds in Montaigne’s travel 
account a contrast between Western knowledge 
and savage speech, between the writing technol-
ogy of a conquering culture and a society organized 
around acts (the savage has ‘no knowledge of 
letters’, but his practice of cannibalism and polyg-
amy corresponds to an economy of speech acts). 
The European tries to represent the other, that is, to 
give the other a place, a tradition prefigured in Hero-
dotus’s attempt to define the nomadic Scythians in 
opposition to the Athenian city-dweller. This cartog-
raphy of bodies in space - drawing, writing - both 
produces an image of the other and establishes its 
own status as knowledge of the other. Like Herodo-
tus’s Histories, Montaigne’s ‘linguistic artifact’ builds 
its science on a constantly receding subject. But the 
text is haunted by another absence: Montaigne’s 
dearest friend Étienne de la Boétie (1530-63), ‘the 
only true listener’ who ‘is no longer’. For de Certeau, 
‘Of Cannibals’ demonstrates how writing production 
in modernity occurs between two absences: the 
‘speech acts’ it reports but which remain radically 
other to the fixity of text, and the reception it antici-
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seductive projects.58 But who seduces whom? Are 
architects not seduced by the body whose place 
they articulate in drawing? I am tempted to say that 
Josephine Baker understood what Loos’s poor rich 
man did not. 
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